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Abstract 37 
 38 
Background 39 
Evidence suggest that social protection policies such as Brazil’s Bolsa Família 40 
Programme (BFP), a governmental conditional cash transfer, may play a role in TB 41 
elimination. However, study limitations hamper conclusions. This paper uses a quasi-42 
experimental approach to more rigorously evaluate the effect of BFP on TB treatment 43 
success rate. 44 
  45 
Methods 46 
Propensity scores were estimated from a complete-case logistic regression using 47 
covariates from a linked dataset, including the Brazil’s TB notification system (SINAN), 48 
linked to the national registry of those in poverty (CadUnico) and the BFP payroll.  49 
 50 
Results 51 
The average effect of treatment on the treated (ATT) was estimated as the difference in 52 
TB treatment success rate between matched groups (i.e. the control and exposed 53 
patients, n = 2167). TB patients receiving BFP showed a treatment success rate 10.58 54 
percentage point higher (95% CIs: 4∙39, 16∙77) than TB patients not receiving BFP. This 55 
association was robust to sensitivity analyses.  56 
  57 
Conclusions 58 
This study further confirms a positive relationship between the provision of conditional 59 
cash transfers and TB treatment success rate. Further research is needed to understand 60 
how to enhance access to social protection so to optimise public health impact. 61 
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Summary box 62 
What is already known 63 
 While encouraging, evidence about the impact of cash transfers on TB control are still 64 
scattered and conclusions are often hampered by important studies limitations 65 
 66 
What are the new findings 67 
 This is the first study using a quasi-experimental design to evaluate the impact of 68 
Bolsa Familia on TB treatment success 69 
 TB patients enrolled in Bolsa Familia are more likely to complete their treatment 70 
successfully 71 
 Approximately half of TB patients included in this study population were not enrolled 72 
in the cash transfer program despite being eligible based on the income inclusion 73 
criterion 74 
 75 
What the new findings imply 76 
 Conditional cash transfers like Bolsa Familia can contribute to TB elimination even if 77 
they were not designed for this purpose 78 
 Disparity in access is a missed opportunity to maximise TB-impact of Bolsa Familia  79 
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Introduction 80 
Despite biomedical efforts, the global burden of Tuberculosis (TB) remains considerable, 81 
with up to 1.5 million deaths from TB recorded in 2015. 1 Tuberculosis treatment takes 82 
many months, and a proportion of patients are not cured, either because they abandon 83 
treatment, take treatment irregularly, are infected with drug resistant TB, or die before 84 
completion of treatment.1 The correlation between TB indicators and global poverty has 85 
been demonstrated both at ecological and individual level, yet much of the morbidity and 86 
mortality in TB patients still occurs amongst the poorest segments of the population.2 87 
Social determinants impact vulnerability to TB at every stage of the disease pathway, 88 
from TB infection to clinical outcomes, including whether or not the patient was 89 
successfully treated.3 Ending the global burden of TB requires bold policies and 90 
supportive systems able to recognise and tackle these social determinants.4  91 
  92 
Recognising this social aspect of TB epidemiology, social protection is now a non-93 
negotiable component to reach the TB elimination targets set by the World Health 94 
Organization, including zero households affected by catastrophic costs, defined as TB-95 
related expenditures when they exceed 20% of pre-illness annual household income.5  96 
Brazil in particular has been an early adopter of the WHO End TB strategy,6 as reflected 97 
by its long term efforts to integrate development and health agendas. This is partially due 98 
to the long social protection tradition in Latin America, which in Brazil culminated with the 99 
creation of the Bolsa Família Programme in 2003, one of the largest conditional cash 100 
transfer programmes in the world.7 101 
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In 2010, the Bolsa Família Programme (BFP) provided a variable monthly stipend to 102 
households meeting certain socioeconomic criteria: households earning less than 70 103 
Brazilian Real a month (~22 USD at time of writing) and households with children, 104 
adolescents, or pregnant women earning less than 140 Brazilian Reala month. BFP’s 105 
targeting is not exact, and individuals reporting an income above 140 Brazilian Realcan 106 
be found in the BFP payroll.7 In order to receive BFP, families must be registered in the 107 
Cadastro Unico (Single Registry; CadÚnico), a registry of all low income Brazilian 108 
families. In return for the transfers, recipients must comply with behavioural obligations 109 
(i.e. school attendance; immunization). BFP is not explicitly intended to target TB-affected 110 
households and only ¼ of TB patients in Brazil appear to be enrolled in the programme; 111 
given the intimate association between poverty and TB, underenrolment is likely.8Albeit 112 
accumulating, the literature on the impact of conditional cash transfers on a variety of TB 113 
indicators is still limited, and there has been little methodologically rigorous evaluation of 114 
social protection interventions for TB prevention, care, and control, including treatment 115 
outcomes.9 There has also been some support in the literature for financial incentives having a 116 
small positive effect on TB outcomes,10 but the underlying philosophy, mechanisms of action, as 117 
well as the ethical and sustainability implications for financial incentives may differ from cash 118 
transfers embedded into proper governmental social protection platforms.11 119 
. Despite its scarcity, the evidence is converging upon a consistent positive impact of 120 
social protection on TB epidemiology and control, including some small scale trials and 121 
studies in Peru,12  Moldova13 and South Africa.14 15 16As for Brazil, the literature is even 122 
more rich even if evidence do not necessarily follow from proper controlled trials.15-18 123 
Torrens et al8  have already attempted to estimate the impact of BFP on TB treatment 124 
success rates and found out that that TB patients enrolled in BFP were approximately 7% 125 
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more likely to be successfully treated after treatment than a control group.8 While the 126 
findings of this study are consistent with what observed in the literature, conclusions are 127 
hampered by the potential biased nature of the control group.8 128 
For an unbiased estimate of the proportion of patients cured attributable to BFP, we must 129 
construct a control group as similar as possible to the group of BFP recipients. This group 130 
of BFP recipients on average have some TB treatment success rate. We wish to estimate 131 
the difference in that treatment success rate if, counter to fact, that group of patients had 132 
not received BFP, but had the same sociodemographic characteristics and were thus still 133 
enrolled in CadÚnico.  134 
To this aim, we approach the same routine data source as in Torrens et al8 using a quasi-135 
experimental approach to construct a more appropriate control group and to then 136 
determine a more rigorous estimate of the effect of BFP on TB treatment success rate 137 
amongst those who receive it. Specifically, we aimed to: 1) use propensity score matching 138 
to create a control group balanced for propensity to receive BFP, 2) provide an estimate 139 
of the average treatment effect of BFP on TB treatment success rate amongst recipients 140 
and 3) to reflect on the utility of the resulting estimate for changing TB policy.  141 
  142 
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Methods 143 
Conceptual Framework - DAG 144 
A directed acyclic graph (DAG) was proposed for conceiving of the causal relationships 145 
between the outcome, the exposure, and all the variables hypothesised to be on the 146 
causal pathway (Figure 1). Each node in the DAG consists of a high-level construct 147 
measured by proxy variables taken from the set of covariates available. The nodes in this 148 
DAG were constructed based on a variety of theoretical literature, and the grouping of 149 
covariates under one node denotes that they are considered to be measures of that 150 
underlying construct for the purposes of this paper.3 19 20 Appendix 1 outlines explicitly 151 
which covariates fall under each node. 152 
 153 
The DAG outlines potential mechanisms by which BFP (“the exposure”) is proposed to 154 
affect treatment success rate (“the outcome”). These include via access to directly 155 
observed treatment and via increased capacity for mitigation of catastrophic costs 156 
(expenditure). We provide an estimate for the direct effect of social protection outside of 157 
these pathways, which may include expanded access to healthcare through means other 158 
than DOT, increased psychological wellbeing, or greater integration into governmental 159 
systems in general. The DAG also outlines pathways between treatment success rate 160 
and income (and therefore access to BFP), through complex relationships between 161 
demographics, geography, and socioeconomic factors. The ‘treatment success’ outcome 162 
includes those who completed treatment with or without bacteriological confirmation. 163 
Data Handling 164 
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The data for this study arose from a linkage between the 2010 TB dataset from SINAN 165 
(Brazil's national Notifiable Disease Surveillance System) and the 2011 CadÚnico dataset 166 
The CadÚnico dataset was itself linked to the Bolsa Familia payroll held by the Caixa 167 
Federal (Federal Bank). The linkage added the demographic and social information from 168 
CadÚnico and the BFP payroll to every TB patient in the SINAN dataset. 169 
Ethical approval for use of the dataset was obtained by The Research Ethics Committee of the 170 
Institute of Center of Health Sciences of the Federal University of Espirito Santo [protocol number 171 
242,831]. Patient data did not contain identifiable information and was stored in accordance with 172 
LSHTM’s data governance protocol. 173 
Of the complete SINAN-CadÚnico-BFP dataset (n = 180046), only individuals who were 174 
new TB cases registered in CadUnico in 2010 with a non-missing treatment outcome 175 
variable were retained for this study (n = 16760). Exposed individuals (defined here as 176 
those receiving BFP) were further restricted to those whose receipt of BFP preceded case 177 
closure. Case closure is defined as the date on which an outcome (e.g. treated, 178 
unsuccessful completion of treatment, death) is recorded. The final dataset used for 179 
analysis included 13,029 individuals, 6,940 of whom received BFP. The dataset contained 180 
a set of 60 covariates that could be used for propensity score matching (i.e. categorical 181 
or numerical data). 182 
Many of these 60 covariates had a considerable amount of missing data. Data was 183 
assumed to be missing completely at random. Variables that were recorded as missing 184 
in over 50% of individuals were omitted from the analysis. These variables included house 185 
type (permanent/improvised), roof, floor, and wall material, number of people and families 186 
in the home, number of bedrooms and bathrooms, variables relating to employment 187 
status, expenditure on rent and transport, and receipt of pension, unemployment benefit, 188 
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and alimony. It is conceivable that rent and transport expenditure could be important 189 
confounders of treatment success rate given the potential of cash transfers for mitigating 190 
catastrophic costs, but neither are conditionally associated with both outcome and 191 
exposure in the observed data and expenditure is represented by other retained 192 
variables.21  193 
 194 
The omission of variables with this level of missing data resulted in 45 covariates to be 195 
considered for use in propensity score estimation. A sensitivity analysis was run omitting 196 
all variables with over 25% missing data, which further omitted water expenditure and 197 
years of formal education. At both missing data thresholds, at least one proxy covariate 198 
remained under each node of the DAG such that no high-level construct was 199 
unrepresented by the available covariates. 200 
 201 
Propensity Score Matching 202 
Without applying propensity score approaches or other approaches to control for 203 
confounding, it is likely that the values of the available covariates between the exposed 204 
and the unexposed (and those who experience or do not experience the outcome) vary, 205 
which potentially biases comparisons between groups. We wish to achieve a ‘balance’ in 206 
these values, that may approximate the balance produced by conventional randomisation 207 
procedures. We wish to first determine the likelihood of receiving BFP given the covariate 208 
values, which is represented by the propensity score. If the propensity score is then 209 
balanced between groups by matching, it is as though the covariates that were used to 210 
estimate the propensity score were themselves balanced.22 211 
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Propensity scores were estimated by logistic regression. One of two criteria must be met for 212 
a variable to be included in this logistic regression: a) conditional association with the outcome 213 
given exposure, to improve precision or b) both association with exposure and conditional 214 
association with outcome given exposure, to account for confounding.23 These criteria apply to 215 
both mediators and confounders and can be determined from the DAG (Figure 1). All 216 
DAG nodes meet these criteria but housing and thus the covariates used to model the 217 
propensity score were all non-housing covariates meeting the missing data threshold. 218 
Quadratic forms of the continuous covariates were used in the logistic regression but 219 
sensitivity analyses were performed without including them. Two-way interactions 220 
between gender and all variables and age and all variables were also used, given it is 221 
likely that these covariates would differ in effect across strata.  222 
  223 
Each patient who did not receive BFP (i.e. not exposed) was matched to a patient who 224 
did receive it (i.e. exposed) closest in propensity score, within a particular ‘caliper' of 0∙1 225 
standard deviations from the mean propensity score. Matching was done with 226 
replacement and multiple matches to minimise both bias and variance, following Caliendo 227 
& Kopeinig (2008).24 Multiple matches were weighted to form one matched control for 228 
each patient. Standardised mean differences and overlap plots were examined to assess 229 
whether balance was improved by matching. 230 
 231 
Throughout the literature, complete cases are used for propensity score matching, and 232 
this is the approach used in this paper.24 This reduced the dataset to 2167 individuals at 233 
the 50% missing data threshold and 3048 individuals at the 25% threshold. 234 
 235 
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Estimating the Impact of Bolsa Familia 236 
Taking the difference of the proportion of treatment successs between matched groups 237 
resulted in an estimate of the average effect of treatment on the treated (ATT), or the 238 
(causal) risk difference in the exposed. The procedure used in Abadie & Imbens (2011)25 239 
was used to estimate the standard error of the ATT and thus the confidence intervals. 240 
The confidence intervals thus account for the uncertainty due to the matching procedure, 241 
but do not account for the uncertainty due to the fact that the estimated propensity score 242 
is itself a function of the data; this latter feature leads to conservative inferences.25 The 243 
ATT was also estimated by a multiple imputation based sensitivity analysis, and point 244 
estimates from this are provided for comparative purposes in Appendix 2.  245 
 246 
Statistical Software 247 
All analyses were conducted in R v3.4.1 and the MatchIt package was used for the 248 
propensity score matching procedure. 249 
Role of the Funding Source and conflict of interest 250 
This work was sponsored by a grant from the Wellcome Trust to the PI (n. 104473/Z/14/Z). 251 
The funders had no role in study design, data collection and analysis, decision to publish, 252 
or preparation of the manuscript. Authors declare no conflicts of interest. The 253 
corresponding author had full access to all the data in the study and had final 254 
responsibility for the decision to submit for publication.   255 
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Results 256 
Propensity Score Matching – Covariate Balance 257 
A complete balance table is presented in Table 2 in Appendix 1 for the match produced 258 
by Model A for all covariates included in the propensity score matching exercise. There 259 
is good similarity of the covariates after matching, suggesting a reasonable balance was 260 
obtained between groups. Prior to matching, there were some imbalances found between 261 
BFP recipients and non-recipients on important covariates. Figure 2 presents the changes 262 
in standardised mean difference between those receiving BFP (i.e. exposed) and those 263 
not receiving BFP (i.e. not exposed) before and after matching. Figure 3 presents overlap 264 
plots to demonstrate the similarity of the propensity score values between groups.  265 
Propensity score matching in general resulted in improved balance of the values of 266 
covariates between cases and controls. A standardised mean difference of below 0.1 267 
implies that groups do not differ greatly between values of the covariate.23 Though the 268 
matching process only brought 50% of the imbalanced variables below this threshold, a 269 
large improvement was seen on the balance of important upstream covariates like age 270 
(0∙42 to 0∙01), income (0∙40 to 0∙09), and schooling (0∙24 to 0∙12). The change in 271 
distributions of these variables after matching can be seen in Figure 3. On average, those 272 
receiving BFP in the unmatched cohort were younger (34∙5 vs. 41∙3 years), poorer (65∙2 273 
vs. 197∙4 Brazilian Realper month), and less educated (89∙2% vs 83.5% not completed 274 
secondary school).  275 
 276 
From Figure 3, 20∙9% of TB patients fall under the 70 Brazilian Realincome threshold for 277 
unconditional receipt of BFP and therefore are theoretically eligible for the programme, 278 
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but yet excluded from it. A further 29∙4% fall under the 140 Brazilian Real income 279 
threshold and could therefore potentially be eligible for BFP.  280 
 281 
Estimating the Impact of Bolsa Familia 282 
In total, four estimates of the ATT were produced (Table 1). Model A is the primary model 283 
of interest as it is the most complex model specification. Models B-D represent sensitivity 284 
analyses on Model A to investigate how sensitive the results are to simplifying changes 285 
to these modelling and missing data decisions.  286 
  287 
The average effect of treatment on the treated from Model A was estimated to be 10∙58 288 
(95% CIs: 4∙39, 16∙77) (Table 1). Thus, amongst TB patients who receive BFP, we expect 289 
a treatment success rate 10∙58 percentage points higher than if those patients had not 290 
received the benefit. The proportion successfully treated in those who did not receive BFP 291 
was 76∙6% compared to 87∙2% in the BFP recipients. This average treatment effect is 292 
protective even when a simpler model is used and when the missing data threshold at 293 
which covariates are omitted is reduced to 25%, with ATT estimates between 6∙31 and 294 
7∙21 (Table 1). It is also in broad agreement with an ATT point estimate of 7∙22 obtained 295 
from a multiple imputation approach (Appendix 2). Expressed as number needed to treat 296 
(NTT), the estimated ATT implies that on average, amongst TB patients who received 297 
Bolsa Familia before acquiring TB, one unsuccessful treatment outcome was averted 298 
because of Bolsa Familia for every nine patients. 299 
 300 
 301 
  302 
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Discussion 303 
Summary – Interpretation of Results 304 
This is the first study that uses a quasi-experimental approach to estimate the impact of 305 
a conditional cash transfer programme on TB treatment success rates.9 Across all 306 
models, results have shown a substantial absolute increase in TB treatment success rate 307 
(between 7-11%) amongst those who receive BFP. This seems to suggests a consistent 308 
positive association between receiving BFP on a key indicator of TB control: treatment 309 
success rate. This is in line with Torrens et al. (2016),8 Durovni et al. (2017)15 and a few 310 
other previous studies evaluating the relationship between social protection and TB 311 
outcomes undertaken using less rigorous methodologies and adjusting for only a subset 312 
of potential confounders, which also demonstrate a protective effect of similar scale.13 26 313 
Given the already relatively high treatment success rate in Brazil, it can be expected that 314 
the size of impact may be even higher in settings within and outside Brazil, with lower 315 
treatment success rates and a less effective TB control program. Similar propensity score 316 
approaches have already been used to evaluate the effect of cash transfers in HIV/AIDS, 317 
but not on TB.27  318 
Another important and somewhat unexpected finding of our analysis is that the profile of 319 
TB patients enrolled in BFP was not overtly dissimilar from TB patients that have not 320 
received BFP even before matching. Figure 2 suggests that the most imbalanced 321 
covariates for receipt of BFP (based on the standardised mean difference) were state of 322 
residence, income, age, and schooling. There may also be differences between recipients 323 
and non-recipients based on measures of the infrastructure of the local area (sewage, 324 
electricity, trash disposal). TB patients not benefiting from BFP transfers appear to be 325 
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broadly similar to TB patients who are BFP recipients under a number of other 326 
sociodemographic characteristics, particularly on comorbidities such as diabetes and 327 
alcohol abuse, as well as on DOT prevalence (Table 1 in Appendix 1).  This suggests 328 
there may be some shared vulnerability amongst TB patients (i.e. concomitant 329 
socioeconomic stressors, diverse ability to navigate complex social services), that are not 330 
captured by the current BFP targeting and enrolment process, leading to some degree of 331 
disparity in access to social protection and specifically BFP in Brazil. Even when looking 332 
strictly to the BFP eligibility criterion (i.e. income), our results show that up to 51∙3% of 333 
patients may be theoretically eligible for BFP, but yet left out. This seems to further 334 
suggest that the income threshold for BFP is insufficiently specific to ensure access to 335 
vulnerable TB patients. 336 
 337 
Strengths & Limitations 338 
The utilisation of quasi-experimental approach is a major strength of this paper. Quasi-339 
experimental approaches like propensity score matching require fewer assumptions 340 
about the data than traditional parametric counterparts. The specification of the estimand 341 
and population parameters of interest are an additional strength to using propensity score 342 
matching, and the risk of bias from residual confounding is minimised compared to prior 343 
work by careful use of a DAG.28 While the use of propensity scores for matching has 344 
recently drawn some criticism,29 the diagnostic plots demonstrated in Figures 2 & 3 show 345 
that balance was improved by matching, and a number of model specifications for the 346 
propensity score were tested and found to demonstrate a similar positive impact.  347 
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Indeed, a clear strength of this work is the comparability of the control group. As 348 
demonstrated in Figure 3, those in the exposed group and those in the control group have 349 
a very similar distribution of propensity to receive BFP. This overlap suggests that we are 350 
only comparing patients with similar covariate profiles: while some of the control patients 351 
may not be eligible on paper for BFP, in the complex context of real-world receipt of BFP, 352 
the not-exposed group (our ‘control’ group) resemble almost exactly those TB patients 353 
who receive BFP on all measured variables and are representative of a broad range of 354 
TB patients from across Brazil. This is a methodological improvement over the control 355 
groups seen in prior work which greatly strengthens the quality of evidence available to 356 
policymakers. 357 
 358 
The control group in Durovni et al15 was taken from a pool of all TB patients rather than 359 
those who are registered in CadÚnico, and therefore some patients ineligible for BFP 360 
were included in the control group. The control group in Torrens et al8 was taken from TB 361 
patients who were eligible in theory for BFP, but who had not received any money from 362 
the programme until after treatment. This control group had different characteristics to 363 
those TB patients not eligible for the programme on demographic and socioeconomic 364 
variables examined by the authors. Both of these control groups may have potentially 365 
biased the resulting estimate of proportion of patients cured attributable to BFP.  366 
This quasi-experimental approach also implies the possibility of drawing causal 367 
conclusions. The estimand used in this study, the average treatment effect on the treated, 368 
could be given a causal interpretation if particular ‘identifying’ assumptions hold, including 369 
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 i) positivity, which implies that no individual has a probability of 1 of receiving BFP 370 
conditional on their confounders, ii) consistency, which implies that different variations of 371 
receiving BFP do not have different effects on TB outcomes, and iii) conditional 372 
exchangeability, which implies that there is no residual confounding. We note that while 373 
BFP might appear to create a structural violation of the positivity assumption with its 374 
income threshold, examining the threshold itself it was noted that the cutoff was often 375 
inaccurately applied and thus very few random positivity violations were encountered in 376 
the matched set. With regards to the consistency assumption, we specifically assumed 377 
that receipt of any amount of transfer for any amount of time was sufficient in this context, 378 
but further work should investigate dose-response relationships between cash transfers 379 
& TB. Drawing causal conclusions is however hampered by the non-interference 380 
assumption, which in this context assumes that the exposure received by one individual 381 
does not affect the outcome of the other. The results of this study suggest that the size of 382 
effect found may be too large to ignore this assumption and work should be undertaken 383 
to investigate the effect of social protection on TB transmission. Another potential violation 384 
of this assumption is that BFP increases the probability of treatment success not only in 385 
recipients but also in other cases through community effects of the cash transfer. 386 
In conclusion, while most identifying assumptions are potentially plausible, we cannot 387 
draw conclusions about causality given the interference limitations outlined above. The 388 
circumstances under which causal inferences can be drawn with interference is an area 389 
of ongoing research.30  390 
Another limitation to this work is the data quality. The missing data results in a relatively 391 
small sample size used for matching and we cannot rule out the possibility of residual 392 
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confounding from covariates that are mostly missing or remain unbalanced. Remaining 393 
imbalance on the state variable suggests data may be missing conditionally at random 394 
on the state variable. As information on it is housed within a separate register, we were 395 
unable to assess the impact of the Family Health Strategy, though previous work 396 
suggests the effect of BFP is independent of FHS coverage.15 While an approach 397 
combining multiple imputation and propensity score matching would have mitigated this 398 
problem, there remain many gaps in the literature on the practical implementation of these 399 
techniques together (see Appendix 2). Furthermore, the data linkage is cross-sectional 400 
and thus time-varying confounding cannot be accounted for with these data; better data 401 
availability longitudinally would allow for measurement on more direct measures of TB 402 
control, such as incidence.  403 
 404 
The choice of a dichotomous outcome variable may be another limitation: non-success 405 
outcomes include continued disease post regimen completion, treatment abandonment, 406 
death from TB, death from other causes, and development of MDR-TB, which may have 407 
heterogeneous risk factors. Loss to follow up and transferred cases are also not 408 
considered by this analysis – the analysis is agnostic about whether these patients were 409 
cured or not cured. The results may be different if each non-success outcome were 410 
addressed in turn, but this would require a larger sample size and may be best addressed 411 
in a descriptive study. 412 
 413 
Policy Implications 414 
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Despite the above limitations, these findings preliminarily suggest that: 1) there is a 415 
considerable proportion of TB patients eligible for BFP that for unknown reasons seem to 416 
be left out from the programme; 2) almost half of the TB patients will not be eligible for 417 
BFP according to income thresholds, and thus there is room for a more comprehensive 418 
or multidimensional targeting approach not only using income as eligibility criteria. Given 419 
the 7-11% absolute increase in treatment success rate seen amongst those receiving 420 
BFP from our work, from a health rights perspective, it must be considered how best to 421 
deliver a protective programme to vulnerable patients in Brazil. 422 
 423 
BFP was not designed to address specific diseases, not least TB: TB status is not a 424 
targeting criteria and none of the conditionalities currently imposed by the program have 425 
any direct implication for TB care and/or TB control. Despite the suggested positive 426 
impact, ethical and equity issues make unlikely that TB will become one of the eligibility 427 
criteria of BFP. Nonetheless access could be expanded, and thus impact maximised, by 428 
making BFP more TB-sensitive through a more inclusive, albeit non-stigmatising, 429 
targeting strategy. Higher impact could in fact be achieved by simply ensuring that 430 
patients that are already eligible by definition for the programme receive the benefits, or 431 
at least receive them while on treatment. To this purpose, further research is urgently 432 
needed to understand determinants of access to BFP from TB patients and to explore 433 
those supply and demand side barriers that delay the transfer of benefits once TB-434 
patients are legitimately enrolled.  435 
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Understanding how to effectively and cost-effectively remove these individual and system 436 
level barriers and what may be the ultimate impact on the Brazilian TB epidemic is a 437 
priority research area, whose lessons may be transferrable to other settings.  438 
Nonetheless, it can be anticipated that the removal of these barriers may require the 439 
implementation of more efficient BFP delivery models, including the ‘single window’ 440 
approach which entails an integrated delivery of TB care services and social protection.31 441 
According to this model, the access to the most appropriate social protection schemes is 442 
determined and facilitated at the primary health care level where ad hoc staff (e.g. social 443 
workers) are trained to assess the social protection needs of TB patients and provide 444 
information, legal and administrative advices, and referrals to various services so to allow 445 
patients to access benefits from one ‘single window’ without having to navigate across 446 
complex and multiple service points.31 447 
 448 
Another emerging model for the delivery of social protection is the ‘cash plus’ model in 449 
which the provision of cash transfers is combined with another form of social support 450 
when the provision of in kind benefits is not deemed sufficient to reduce households’ 451 
vulnerabilities (including health related vulnerabilities).32  452 
 453 
In the case of TB in Brazil, this ‘plus’ component can be represented by a top up of the 454 
cash benefit to account for the TB-related catastrophic costs incurred by the households; 455 
or the provision of a food basket to improve nutrition of cash beneficiaries and therefore 456 
their treatment outcome; or the improvement of housing and ventilation conditions to 457 
interrupt intra-household transmission of TB. To identify the most relevant ‘intensifier’ of 458 
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any cash transfer intervention it will be essential also to understand thoroughly the most 459 
likely pathway through which this impact takes place. This requires the development of a 460 
setting-specific, epidemiologically driven conceptual framework and a more 461 
comprehensive collection of data for the variables in the causal pathway.   462 
To be useful the above research agenda should rely on both quantitative and qualitative 463 
methods to embrace the complexity of pathways likely to underlie impact and the multi-464 
faced nature of determinants of access to cash transfers in the context of TB-affected 465 
communities.  466 
 467 
Conclusions 468 
Overall, the strength of evidence and size of effect of the ATT estimated in this work 469 
seems to suggest that expanding social protection to a wider population of TB patients 470 
may represent a valid mechanism for improving TB outcomes beyond the traditional 471 
biomedical approach. This is consistent with the need of a multisectorial accountability 472 
framework expressed during the last WHO- Global Ministerial Conference held in Moscow 473 
on November 2017 which demands a more pervasive integration of TB programmatic 474 
action within development models and infrastructures.33 It is essential that, like in this 475 
work, recent developments in quasi-experimental methodology continue to be integrated 476 
with the evidence base for bold policies in development. With stronger evidence available, 477 
the rapid implementation of bold policies may be justified in TB contexts and the global 478 
public health community will be a large step closer to achieving the aims of the WHO’s 479 
End-TB Strategy. 480 
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Table 1. Results of propensity score matching estimates of the ATT for four models. 581 
  582 
Models* 
n controls  = 
898 
n exposed = 
1269 
ATT1 95% 
Confidence 
Intervals 
  
N Controls 
Matched 
(unweighted) 
N Exposed 
dropped 
N Pairs 
Matched 
(weighted) 
N Unique 
Controls 
Model A 10.58 (4.39, 16.77) 6021 109 1160 545 
Model B*** 7.21 (1.33, 13.09) 6468 21 1248 656[D2]  
  583 
Models** - 
n controls = 
1319 
n exposed = 
1729 
ATT1 95% 
Confidence 
Intervals 
N Controls 
Matched 
(unweighted) 
N Exposed 
dropped 
N Pairs 
Matched 
(weighted) 
N Unique 
Controls 
Model C 6.31 (1.46, 11.16) 8895 70 1659 955 
Model D*** 7.06 (2.57, 11.56) 9272 17 1712 1001 
 584 
*Model A includes linear and quadratic forms of continuous covariates and omits variables with > 585 
50% missing data to estimate the propensity score. Variables included in the final propensity 586 
score are those listed in bold in the caption to Figure 1. 587 
** Models C & D omit variables with > 25% missing data  588 
*** Models B & D omit quadratic forms of continuous covariates 589 
 1 ATT= Average effect of Treatment on the Treated.  590 
 5 
 
The matching used was many-to-one with replacement. Some exposed patients were not similar 591 
enough to any control patients according to the caliper threshold and these individuals were 592 
dropped from the analysis (N Exposed dropped). Some controls were not similar enough to any 593 
exposed patients and were thus not used as potential matches and dropped from the analysis. 594 
The remaining controls (N Unique Controls) were then ‘copied’ a number of times to be used as 595 
potential matches (N controls matched unweighted). Each control was not matched individually, 596 
but rather weighted to form one matched comparator for each treatment patient. These matched 597 
comparator patients were matched to the treatment patients to form matched pairs (Pairs of 598 
controls and treated cases matched). The number of pairs may thus be higher than the total initial 599 
sample size as some controls were used more than once and some were not used at all. 600 
  601 
 6 
 
Figure 1. DAG outlining the pathways linking Bolsa Familia with TB outcomes. 602 
 603 
 604 
 605 
 606 
 607 
 608 
A directed acyclic graph (DAG) was built to conceptualise the potentially causal relationships 609 
between constructs relevant for measuring the impact of Bolsa Familia on TB treatment success 610 
rate. Red nodes are ancestors of both the outcome and the exposure (i.e. confounders) while 611 
grey nodes are unassociated with the outcome and exposure. Blue nodes are ancestors of the 612 
outcome. 613 
The DAG links nodes that represent constructs that are measured by covariates (Table A). 614 
 615 
TABLE A 616 
 617 
 618 
Node (Construct) Covariates Included in 
Model 
Covariates Excluded 
from Model (Missing 
Data Threshold) 
Covariates Excluded 
from Model (No 
Available Measure) 
State State   
Race Race, Indigenous, 
Quilombola 
  
Local Area Urbanicity, Running Water, 
Sewage, Electricity, Water 
Store, Garbage Collection 
House Type Transit Access 
Education Years of Education, Literacy   
Socioeconomic 
Vulnerability 
Child Work, 
Institutionalisation, Work-
Acquired TB 
Employment, Pension 
Receipt, 
Unemployment 
Benefit, Alimony 
Receipt 
Food Security, 
Adequate Nutrition, 
Perception of Poverty 
Age & Sex Age, Sex  Gender Identity 
Comorbidities AIDS, Alcohol Use Disorder, 
Diabetes, HIV, Mental 
Disorder, Other Chronic 
Illness 
 General Mental 
Health, Stress 
Income Income   
Expenditure (on) Food, Energy, Gas, 
Water 
(on) Rent, Transport Medical Costs 
Health Seeking 
Behaviour 
Directly Observed 
Treatment 
 Engagement with 
Primary Care 
TB Form & Severity Chest X-Ray, Initial Sputum 
Smear, 
Pulmonary/Extrapulmonary, 
Throat Culture, Tuberculin 
Skin Test 
 MDR TB (is included in 
outcome as non-
successful treatment) 
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Drug Regimen Rifampicin, Isoniazid, 
Ethambutol, Streptomycin, 
Pyrazinamide, Ethionamide, 
Other Drugs 
  
 619 
Not all covariates included under one of the constructs in the DAG were included in the propensity 620 
score model.  Table A summarises which covariates were included and which were excluded. 621 
Some covariates that might reasonably be part of the pathways encoded in this DAG were 622 
excluded as there was no adequate measure of them in this linked administrative data. Other 623 
covariates were excluded by the missing data threshold, which itself was chosen to balance 624 
measurability of each of the constructs with the loss of sample size from undertaking a complete 625 
case analysis. 626 
 627 
The Housing Quality node was not included in the model as it was not associated with outcome 628 
(TB mortality) or exposure. The Housing node included measureable covariates of roof, floor, and 629 
wall material, number of people in the home, and the number of bedrooms and bathrooms, as 630 
well as the unmeasurable covariate of indoor air pollution.  631 
 632 
 1 
 
Figure 2. Standardised Mean Difference 633 
 634 
 635 
 636 
 637 
 638 
 639 
 640 
 641 
 642 
The change in standardised mean difference in the matched and unmatched groups for each 643 
variable. A smaller difference indicates improved balance between groups; being below the 644 
threshold of 0.1 is conservatively considered to be effectively balanced. Balance has been largely 645 
improved by matching though some imbalance remains between groups. [Labels: exp = 646 
expenditure; thorax  = chest X-ray; bacilo.i = initial sputum smear; throat = throat culture; tst = 647 
tuberculin skin test; mental = mental disorder; disorder = any other chronic illness; iso = isoniazid; 648 
eti = ethionamide; rif = rifampicin; pir = pyrazinamide; est = streptomycin; eta = ethambutol] 649 
 650 
 651 
 652 
 653 
 654 
 655 
 656 
 657 
 658 
 659 
 660 
 661 
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Figure 3. Overlap in estimated propensity scores between those receiving and those not 662 
receiving BFP before matching (top left) and after matching (top right) 663 
 664 
 665 
 666 
 667 
 668 
 669 
 670 
 671 
 672 
 673 
 674 
Overlap has been substantially improved by matching to treated (exposed) patients, 675 
suggestive of the groups being balanced on the propensity score. The region of overlap 676 
extends between 0 and 1. Also presented are similar plots of variable distribution before 677 
and after matching for income, age, and schooling (from top to bottom). Dotted lines on 678 
the income distributions mark the thresholds for BFP eligibility. 679 
 680 
 681 
Before Matching                                          After Matching 
